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Abstract:
Efforts to assess the possibilities for decoupling economic growth from negative environmental
impacts have examined their historical relationship, with varying and inconclusive results. Part
of the problem is ambiguity about definitions of environmental impacts, e.g. whether to use
territorial or consumption-based measures of environmental impact. This paper shows that
ambiguities arising from definitional changes to GDP are sufficiently large to affect the
outcomes. I review the history of structural revisions to GDP using the example of the United
States, and on international comparisons of purchasing power parity, compare decoupling
results using various historical definitions of GDP on the same environmental indicator, and
demonstrate that changing the GDP data vintage does impact decoupling results in qualitatively
important ways, with and without purchasing power parity. Inconsistencies in economic
measurement introduce an additional layer of ambiguity into historical decoupling evidence and
model projection into the future. To advance debate and be clear about scenario assumptions,
rigorous reporting of GDP definitions used and the sharing of data vintage for subsequent
comparison and replication are urgently needed.
Keywords: decoupling; national accounting; GDP revisions; energy intensity; environmental
Kuznets curve

1. Introduction
Understanding the history of the relationship between gross domestic production (GDP) and
resource and energy use and pollution is important for thinking about the future. On the question
whether GDP growth is compatible with nongrowing or even declining rates of resource use and
pollution, such as greenhouse gas emissions, pivots whether the current global mode of social
provisioning and reproduction couched around expansion of economic value can continue for
the next decades and centuries. The relationship between resources or pollution and GDP is
often expressed as an intensity with GDP in the denominator. A declining intensity is referred to
as decoupling. Patterns of historical decoupling are contested. They influence recommendations
about whether countries should “first grow and clean up later” (Dinda, 2004), and have spawned
large “growth-environment-nexus” and decomposition literatures; a recent review examined 835
empirical studies of decoupling (Wiedenhofer et al., 2020). The numerator of measures of
intensity has been close scrutinized conceptually, leading to competing intensity and decoupling
measures to assess environment impact of economic activity, e.g. whether to use footprint or
1
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territorial measures3 or how to account for primary energy4. Meanwhile, to the author’s best
knowledge, redefinitions of the denominator of any intensity, GDP, has never featured in the
discussion of decoupling estimates.
But GDP is an accounting convention. Its measurement depends on social agreement, not on
natural constants. In fact, at any moment there is more than one GDP measure available, and
more importantly, over time these measures are revised and definitions changed and then
applied to the whole retrospective GDP data series as national accountants themselves
extensively document (e.g. Studenski, 1958; Kendrick, 1970; Vanoli, 2005). Rather than
scrutinizing how these definitional changes impact the relationship between GDP and
environmental impact, the ecological economic debate has instead focused on enlarging GDP
with measures of environmental quality or quantity (Costanza et al., 1997; Hanley, Dupuy and
McLaughlin, 2015). Complete alternatives to GDP have been proposed (Hoekstra, 2019), as
well as post-growth indicators (Victor, 2008). Yet, since the decoupling question continues to
revolve around intensity measures involving plain-vanilla GDP, a better understanding of how
changes in its definition impact decoupling, e.g. whether or not a country is seen to have
decoupled in the past, is vital. In this paper I review how GDP measures regularly undergo
revisions, and then empirically analyze their consequences for intensity measures and
decoupling.
GDP is revised for a variety of reasons. One cause is the updating of ‘base years’ to get a
handle on inflation, another is a redefinition of what constitutes ‘production’ suggested by
economic theory or historical experience, yet another the availability of new data series. To
study the consequences of revisions empirically, I collect vintage data of U.S. GDP going back
to the 1960s (i.e. the GDP time series published in a certain year in the past, e.g. a vintage
published in 1965) from the archive of the Survey of Current Business. I also collect vintages for
a large number of countries back to the 1990s from the national accounts data in a supplement
to successive version of the Penn World Table (PWT). Finally, I collect global GDP from the last
8 editions of the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Indicators. I combine these times
series for GDP with data on primary energy for most countries for the period 1950-2014 to
examine changes to decoupling outcomes for countries contingent on data vintage used. I also
re-estimate the random effects model in Grossman and Krueger’s (1995) seminal paper on the
so-called environmental Kuznets curve in a panel of countries with later GDP vintages to check
what a retrospective analysis would yield. Finally I examine how the IEA’s GDP vintage data
changes our understanding of the decline of the historical global energy intensity.
The key result is that evidence for decoupling does vary in an economically important way with
GDP revisions over time. Some countries decouple or recouple in the same time period,
depending on GDP vintage used. Some of the Grossman and Krueger results change
qualitatively when a more recent GDP vintage is used. And the IEA’s energy intensity
accelerates retrospectively as global GDP growth is continually revised upwards. These results
contribute to the debate about decoupling by showing that results are, to some extent,
contingent on data vintage used. Therefore, studies using different GDP vintages even for the
exact same set of countries and years are not directly comparable in their conclusions. Even a
3
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few years difference in the collection of GDP data can impact measurement. And while one can
argue that the current version of GDP is the most useful for our moment in time, that also
implies that previous GDP vintages are better for earlier years as they were ‘current’ in their
day. The existence of different vintages of GDP introduces an unresolvable ambiguity over past
patterns of growth and hence the attempt to ‘get right’ the historical evidence on decoupling.
This contributes to the persistence of the disagreement about what kind of growth is possible
now or in the future and must be acknowledged when modeling the future based on this
evidence. To advance insight, debate and scenario modeling, rigorous reporting of GDP
definitions, vintage, and the sharing of data for subsequent comparison and replication, is
urgently needed, while policy targets need to be precise about what decoupling they refer to or
avoid reference to aggregate intensities.
The next section reviews GDP revisions both at the national and international level at some
length with a view to familiarizing researchers in environmental and ecological economics with
them. It also gives examples of how GDP revisions impact its magnitude and rate of change,
and reviews related literature. Section 4 introduces the method of analysis and all data sources.
Section 5 presents results of the impact of GDP vintage on decoupling and discusses them.
Section 6 concludes with 3 recommendations for research and policy making.

2. GDP revisions and related literature
GDP is part of any analysis of decoupling. Decoupling refers to the relationship between rates of
change of resource and energy inputs or unwanted or unintended physical outputs (pollution),
call all of them R, and a measure of economic activity, typically GDP. Relative decoupling
occurs when the proportional rate of change of GDP over a certain period is greater than the
proportional rate of change of R in the same period, and so the intensity, R/GDP, falls. A GDP
growth rate of 3% versus an R growth rate of 2% is relative decoupling, and a GDP rate of
decline of -3% versus an R rate of decline of -5% is also relative decoupling. Absolute
decoupling occurs whenever GDP grows and R declines. The complement of these cases is
called recoupling.5 The rest of this section examines how GDP for all past years changes over
time and how there is more than one such time series in use at any time, thereby influencing
intensities and decoupling.
GDP revisions happen all the time. Every quarter and year, statistical agencies first produce
preliminary estimates based on incomplete data and projections, which are revised as better
and more data become available (Van Walbeek, 2006; Fixler, Francisco and Kanal, 2021). Past
research documented an upward bias in some such revisions (Glejser and Schavey, 1969;
Franses, 2009). However, these short-term revisions are not the subject of this paper. Instead
the focus is on structural revisions to the national accounting framework, that do not happen
simply because new information becomes available in the months and sometimes years after
the first estimate. Such structural revisions involve changes in the accounting conventions used
to select and aggregate data. That is, they go beyond mere revisions and completion of the
most recent data. In particular, they involve changes in aggregation methods, base years for
indices, and definitions of GDP (Croushore and Stark, 2003). This phenomenon has variously
been referred to as ‘general revision’ (Siesto, 1987), alteration of the ‘architecture of the national
accounts’ (Jorgenson, 2009), simply ‘changes’ or ‘improvements’ to national accounts (Moulton,
2004) or revision of the system, not just the series (Ruggles, 1990). To avoid confusion with the
widely used term ‘revision’ for successive estimates of the latest data, and following the
5
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Croushoure and Stark (2003) terminology, they will be called structural revisions here. Section
3.1 illustrates the impact of these revisions using U.S. data. Section 3.3 briefly illustrates the
better-known changes to purchasing power parities between countries after explaining the
concept. Section 3.4 reviews related literature.

2.1.

Structural GDP revisions: Example of the US

Structural revisions can be roughly attributed to three causes: reference year changes,
redefinitions and data source changes.6 Appendix A reviews each of them in detail. Here I show
how structural revisions continually take place and impact GDP measurement, using the US
example.
Statistics from the United States National Income and Product Accounts, one of the most
detailed and long-lived system for recording the aggregate economy, are published monthly via
the Survey of Current Business. The August 1965 issue reports gross national product or GNP,
used in the United States until the 1990s instead of its close relative, GDP.7 The Survey then
states in a section titled Definitional Changes, that while there is general agreement on how to
define GNP, “[d]efinitional revisions continue to suggest themselves as the result of further
thought […] and also as the result of improvements in data sources that permit the
implementation of more appropriate definitions and concepts.” (p. 7). The section goes on to
stress that the disagreement about the exact definitions in national accounts resemble debates
in social or natural sciences, and quickly adds that it “is reassuring to note that the definitional
changes that have been made in this report do not greatly affect our measure of the total size of
the national output, [and] of is long-term growth”. This reassurance reveals that the redefinition
has changed (if not greatly) both level and rate of change of GDP.
Forty years later, Brent Moulton, the head of the national accounts program at the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis, which curates and publishes the US GDP figures, enumerates
shortcomings and controversies of the GDP definition (Moulton, 2004). He criticizes not GDP in
its 1965 guise, but the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA), an
international benchmark for how countries should account for GDP. The 1993 SNA itself
included recommendations for substantial redefinitions to GDP compared to the SNAs from
1953 and 1968. Among other things, Moulton criticizes the calculation of return on nonmarket
government investment, the treatment of R&D and of expenditures on military assets as a cost
rather than an investment, and certain aspects of measuring financial services (Moulton 2004).
Since GDP growth is a weighted average of its components, changing any component’s weight,
impacts GDP growth, too. Suppose for instance that GDP was revised to feature a larger
government activity as a share of GDP, e.g. by imputing a return to non-market government
investment (such as into public schools), and imputing it also for all past years for consistency.
Then if we further suppose that government activity expanded more slowly than the rest of the
economy, GDP will suddenly have grown more slowly in the past.
Another edition of the SNA was released in 2008 and took onboard some of the issues Moulton
had raised.8 Since the UN’s SNA serves as a benchmark for internationally comparable national
6
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accounts, it was also implemented in the US national accounts in 2013. Subsequently
economists continue to worry about systematic biases downward (Feldstein, 2017) or upward
(Tercioglu, 2021) in the U.S. growth rate and the accurate measurement of innovation and
intangibles (Corrado et al., 2021). The US example illustrates that GDP gets structurally revised
over time, including via conceptual redefinitions. Such revisions have an impact on the growth
rate, and there is no end to future revisions in sight.
To get a feeling for the impact of structural revisions on the measurement of U.S. economic
growth, consider Figure 2. Panel (a) shows that the definition of GDP agreed in 1980 indicates
that the size of the US economy quadrupled between 1929 and 1986. However, when using the
BEA’s GDP current as of this research (3rd quarter of 2020), which has seen a structural revision
of GDP most recently in 2018, the economy has grown sixfold. Growth was cumulatively more
than 40% faster as the orange series measured on the right hand axis shows. There was some
volatility in the late 1940s, but otherwise we see a fairly steady escape of modern GDP from its
historical counterpart. The series cannot be compared after 1985. This is due to another
structural GDP revision in 1987, which replaced the reporting of the 1980 revision. But if one
were to revisit any publication that used GDP data reported before 1987it would deliver a
strikingly lower GDP growth rate, and hence fewer prospects for decoupling than with current
GDP estimates.
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Figure 1 | Changes in growth rates between vintages of US GDP or GNP: (a) GDP indices from 1986 (black) and
2021 (blue) based on 1976 and 2018 structural revisions, and their ratio in orange measured on the right-hand side
axis. (b) Annual average growth rate over decades of selected structural revisions, data from last year before next
revision. Sources described in section 3.

The US national accounts have gone through a total of 15 structural revisions, occurring about
every 5 years and starting in 1947. Panel (b) shows more systematically how growth rates vary
across several of them (all using GNP, since the 1965 revision did not yet report GDP). Growth
almost always accelerated retrospectively, from one revision to the next. The differences are
typically not very large, year-on-year, but over decades compounded exponential growth adds
up to sizeable differences. The example of Schurr’s energy intensity in Figure 1b illustrates how
such differences can reverse long-term decoupling results. The relatively good availability of
vintage US GDP data (see next section for data sources) makes it convenient to analyze US
GDP. However, it is important to realize that similar structural revisions happen in other
countries (Vanoli, 2005; Bos, 2006).
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As an illustration of how such revisions can have a qualitative impact on decoupling, consider
the path-breaking work by Schurr et al. (1960, Figure 26a) on US commercial energy intensity,
finding an inverted u-curve peaking in 1915 long before association with Simon Kuznets’ name,
and updated by Schurr (1984).9 Schurr describes a period of decoupling from 1930 to about
1945, followed by stability until 1970 and then again decoupling (Figure 2, black series).
However, trends calculated using modern data show more consistent and rapid decoupling
(Figure 2, blue series). 10 Moreover, the historical data show 3 five-year intervals with
recoupling, the modern data only 2. Using exactly the same energy data as Schurr and output
data collected just a few decades later, energy intensity falls 1.5 times faster over the entire 50
year period. GDP growth rates that are supposed to characterize one and the same economy
vary systematically over time.
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Figure 2 | Impact of US GDP vintage on energy intensity. Primary energy intensity as in Schurr (1984) but adding
the 2021 vintage of US GDP. Sources described in section 3.

2.2.

GDP revisions for international comparisons: PPPs

So far the discussion has looked at national revisions. Another level of complexity is introduced
by international comparisons. The most straightforward approach to comparing countries’ GDPs
is to use market exchange rates (MER) that can be readily gleaned from stock markets and data
repositories. However, economists have long debated over whether this is the appropriate
approach (Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1982). In particular, since international comparisons
are often made with an aim of assessing the relative standards of living, the question of what
one can buy with one’s money looms large. GDP converted at market exchange rates gives an
incomplete answer to this question because it is formed from the demand and supply of traded
goods (and international financial market transactions). Many goods and services that
determine one’s standard of living aren’t traded internationally and hence one currency may not
buy the same amount of them in another country even after exchanging at MER. Therefore,
similar to stripping out inflation to compare a country’s growth over time, ‘purchasing power
parity’ (PPP) has attempted to adjust countries’ economies for varying cross-sectional price
levels (see Appendix B for an example).
9
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Measuring PPP exchange rates in practice is difficult and involves many choices. A key problem
is that people in different countries don’t consume the same goods and so estimations of what
prices need to be adjusted are fraught with assumptions (Reddy, 2008). The assumptions made
as well as alternative PPP methods have been reviewed, e.g., in Anand and Segal (2008) or
Deaton and Heston (2010). One result of these difficulties is that calculating PPPs necessitates
the largest global statistical effort, carried out every roughly half decade by the International
Comparison Program. Good reviews of recent rounds of the program are in Deaton and Aten
(2017) and Deaton and Schreyer (2021). Discussions of reasons behind revisions over time are
discussed in Deaton and Heston (2010) and in Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013). Some
believe using PPP GDP for cross country comparison is not a good idea in the first place, or at
least not the preferred or only measure (Acemoglu et al., 2019; Ghosh, 2022).
The key issue for this paper is that every new international comparison exercise creates a new
set of exchange rates, new GDP levels and, to some extent, growth rates. This is not because
national accounts have changed their definition but because consumption baskets and prices
have changed, and the method of operationalizing PPP has as well – a structural PPP revision,
so to speak. In addition, regional and global growth rates are impacted by the change in country
weights (the same is true of MER GDP due to varying MER). Section 4 will elaborate as
necessary.
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To get a sense of magnitudes involved in level changes, Figure 3 plots per capita income in
PPP ‘international’ dollars for four countries for the year 2000 as measured in 5 versions of the
Penn World Table. One can readily see that the level varies considerably. Not only that, it
changes in idiosyncratic ways for every country. While India sees a steady decline, Mexico sees
growth, except in one revision, and China and South Africa depict and undulating movement
across versions. Our focus is on decoupling and rates of change, and cannot examine levels in
detail.

China's GDP/cap
in 2000

India's GDP/cap
in 2000

Mexico's GDP/cap
in 2000

South Africa's GDP/cap
in 2000

Figure 3 | PPP GDP per capita in 2000 according to successive Penn World Table estimates: PPP GDP per
capita in 2000 for four countries at 2005 USD price levels, taken from 5 versions of Penn World Tables published
over the period 2002-2020. Sources described in section 3.

To further illustrate how, even at one point in time, PPP exchange rates can introduce an
additional GDP measure with consequences for decoupling, consider Hickel and Kallis’ (2020)
question “Is Green Growth Possible?”. They answer with a forceful “no”, using selected
quantitative evidence in their argument. A dramatic piece of this evidence is a graph with indices
of global material use and GDP from 1990 to 2017. The material use index grows faster than
7
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GDP and therefore the world has recoupled precisely in that period where more attention was
devoted to decoupling than perhaps ever before. The authors indicate their global GDP source
as “World Bank”. The authors apparently rely on MER GDP rather than the World Bank's PPP
rates, without explaining their choice. While it may not be clear which choice is the best one, it
has momentous implications for the conclusions drawn. If GDP is measured instead at PPP, the
entire period is one of relative decoupling. Figure 4 replicates their graph, but also adds the PPP
GDP index, according to which resources intensity has declined to about 80% of its 1990 value.
Since both types of GDP have their reasons for being used (and PPP GDP is now much more
widely used for global analysis), it is just not unambiguously possible to claim that there has
been recent recoupling with material use.11
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Figure 4 | GDP data definition effect on decoupling: Global material consumption vs GDP indices as in Hickel and
Kallis (2020) but also GDP at purchasing power parity.

2.3.

Related studies

A few studies with environmental concerns have analyzed certain features of sectoral price
indices. Kander (2005) highlights the importance of accounting for sectoral output either in real
or nominal prices. At nominal prices, services attain a larger and larger share in output. Since
services tend to have lower energy intensities, this drives overall decoupling. However, since
the prices of produced goods do not rise as fast as those for services or even fall due to
productivity gains, the volume of services (measured at sectorally deflated prices) does not
necessarily rise as a share of output (see also Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1983; Tregenna,
2009). Therefore expecting a low energy intensity simply because of a nominally measured
large service economy is misguided. Kander provides long-run evidence for Sweden, and
Henriques and Kander (2010) show that service sector transition led to only modest declines in
energy intensity for a larger set of countries. Witt and Gross (2020) document a similar result for
Germany.
The climate change modeling community has debated the impact on growth rates of the use of
MER or PPP GDP. In the early 2000s, Castles and Henderson (2003) attacked the IPCC’s
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Nakićenović et al., 2000) as showing “technically
unsound” scenarios due to their use of MER GDP. Their most salient criticism for present
purposes centered on the combination of MER GDP with a convergence assumption, i.e., less
affluent countries grow to ‘catch up’ with richer ones in GDP per capita terms. Since the gap
between GDP per capita in rich and in developing countries was larger with MER GDP, this led
11
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to very high growth rates in developing countries. The report’s authors retorted that they were
modeling economic activity, not standards of living, among other arguments (Nakicenovic et al.,
2003). The debate went on for several years and its intensity is showcased by Nordhaus (2007)
who argued in favor of using PPP GDP, calling the use of MER “fundamentally wrong” as
understating the income of developing countries, and the refutation of his work by Pant and
Fisher (2007) based on the argument that higher market prices in rich countries may include the
funding of more abundant public goods. The debate and references are reviewed in Pitcher
(2009) who is the only one to my knowledge to note that the revision of historical PPP levels
(but not growth rates) had an impact on subsequent modeling. Ultimately, PPP GDP became
the measure of choice. The 5th Assessment Report in 2014 already used PPP GDP to calculate
intensities, reporting MER GDP only in the online databases. With retrospect, there are two
ironies to this debate. First, while the debate was kindled by differences in MER and PPP
growth rates, the SSP scenarios used in the current IPCC assessment cycle appear to assume
MER and PPP GDP growth rates to be equal (Leimbach et al., 2017). Second, the problem of
incredibly fast growth rates really only occurred due to assumptions about convergence, for
which there is little evidence in the historical growth record (Johnson and Papageorgiou, 2020).
Two other papers are worth mentioning. Kacprzyk and Kuchta (2020) use an ‘alternative’ GDP
to re-estimate environmental Kuznets curve relationships. Rather than comparing vintages of
GDP, however, they estimate GDP based on night-time lighting. And Stern (2017) compares the
performance of past forecasts of global energy intensity from a series of IEA World Economic
Outlooks with the historical times series of that intensity available in 2017 (the conclusion is that
they overestimate the decline in energy intensity). To the extent that the GDP differs between
the historical forecasts and the time of analysis, this may affect Stern’s evaluation of the
forecasts. In sum, despite the important role of structural GDP revisions, to my best knowledge
the question of how this relates to decoupling estimates has not been systematically analyzed.
Method and data for doing so are introduced next.

3. Method and Data
The most straightforward way to examine the impact of GDP revisions on decoupling is to
change the GDP data, all else equal, and compare rates of decoupling. I make pairwise
comparisons of the same measure using different vintages of data. The aim is to examine
changes in degree of decoupling and even of sign over business-cycle length intervals
contingent on data vintage used. Since rates of change are dimensionless this method of
analysis easily spans every possible combination of definitions of GDP. For n different vintages,
the possible combinations of vintages are n!/(n-2)!/2!. Given n=11 vintages found in the Penn
World Table (PWT) and 55 possible combinations, I reduce dimensions by only comparing with
the most recent vintage (PWT 10.0) that would be used by a researcher collecting data today
and by only picking a sample of the 11 older vintages.
Another method is to re-estimate important results in the literature with varying GDP to check for
the salience of changes in estimated decoupling. I pick the examples of the seminal
environmental Kuznets curve study by Grossman and Krueger (1995) and the widely used
historical global decoupling estimates for energy by the IEA (2022) to check whether countrylevel variations matter in the aggregate. Since several countries are involved, purchasing power
parities creep in, and dilute the impact of national GDP redefinitions. Nevertheless, since PPPs
also form part of GDP redefinitions for international comparisons, the results speak to the
problem of GDP vintages, too.

9

I use various data sources. The US GNP data shown previously are from various issues of the
Survey of Current Business (SCB). Some issues describe a structural revision (called
comprehensive update) that was just completed. These issues then report revised GDP data
series back to 1929. The issues just before that will report the last GDP in the old version, and
all the way back to when it was first reported. By joining first and last reports of a particular
comprehensive update, it is possible to construct complete series of GDP of one vintage. For
instance, there was a revision of GDP in 1965 and in 1970. Thus, GDP data were collected from
the SCB August 1965 issue for the years 1929-64 and from the SCB July 1969 issue for 196568. Data were extracted from SCB pdfs on the BEA website, read into Excel using Adobe’s text
recognition software and checked and brought into a table format. From 2003, vintage GDP
data are available readily in Excel format on the BEA website. In total this gives 15 GDP series,
one for each structural revision.12
For multi-country analysis, PWT GDP is from the website of the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015).13 GDP for a large number of
countries is reported in altogether eleven vintages starting with data in 1950 and running until a
few years before the release (see table 1 for an overview). To derive national accounts GDP
growth rates, not those of GDP at PPP, I used the accompanying national accounts data. In
particular, I calculated GDPt for every year by summing CHKONt, GKONt, IKONt, IMPKt and
subtracting EXPKt. I calculated average annual growth rates, g, at from time t over s years as
gt,t+s=(GDPt+s / GDPt)^(1/s)-1. This allows focusing on the impact on national growth rates of the
revision to GDP by national accountants, rather than the variation in relative GDP levels due to
international price comparisons.14
Table 1: Overview over PWT vintages
Version
PWT 5.6
PWT 6.1
PWT 6.2
PWT 6.3
PWT 7.0
PWT 7.1
PWT 8.0
PWT 8.1
PWT 9.0
PWT 9.1
PWT 10.0

Release year
1994
2003
2007
2009
2011
2012
2013
2015
2016
2018
2021

Last data year
1992
2000
2004
2007
2009
2010
2011
2011
2014
2017
2019

Price year (ICP round)
1985
1996
2000
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2011
2011
2017

Global and regional GDP data are from the IEA World Indicators. The IEA make vintage
datasets available back to 2015, and I retrieved the 2013 vintage from earlier work. 2013
reflects the ICP round 2005, the others the ICP rounds from 2011 and 2017. The IEA uses the
World Bank purchasing power parity GDP, from 1990 onwards. Prior to that the IEA converts its
market exchange rates “based on the PPP conversion factor (GDP) to market exchange rate
12

I thank Karl Rohrer from the BEA for pointing out comprehensive updates that an initial literature search hadn’t
unearthed.
13
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/earlier-releases
14
Version 5.6 uses RGDPL (same as RGDP in PWT Mark 5, Summers and Heston, 1991). For versions 8.0 and
above, I took national accounts growth rates (not levels) directly from the RGDPNA variable (Feenstra et al. 2015). In
6.x versions CKON instead of CHKON is reported.
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ratio” (IEA 2020, p. 26). World Bank data from the World Development Indicators downloaded in
2019 also underlies Figure 1a and so uses ICP data from 2011, like the data in Hickel and Kallis
(2020). The World Bank updated its data to ICP 2017 after 2019.
Primary energy data for 1950-2014 for most countries are from the IEA and the United Nations
and the dataset description in Semieniuk et al. (2021). They are used to form energy intensities.
The figure 2 example uses U.S. energy data from the Energy Information Agency website.15
Material data as in Hickel and Kallis is from the International Resource Panel.16 Pollution data
for 14 pollutants is from Grossman and Krueger (1995).

4. Results
4.1.

Country level switches to and from decoupling

To understand changes in energy intensity rates of changes, Figure 5 plots national accounts
(not PPP) growth rates for the same country-time couple under older vintages on the x-axis and
the current PWT 10.0 vintage of GDP on the y-axis. 10-year-average annual rates of change
are measured to avoid short-run fluctuations driving results. Observations come from a rolling
10-year window over each country’s time series for all years available in both vintages. Clearly,
the data are organized along the 45 degree line which indicates continuity in GDP growth rate
measurement across vintages. However, there is considerable scattering around it. Growth
rates for the same period vary across GDP vintages.
Larger time differences between vintages result in lower correlation. The Pearson correlation
coefficient is only 0.86 for plot (a) which compares PWT10.0 with the oldest available vintage,
PWT 5.6. The data cloud is also centered away from the origin, documenting an upward
translation in revising GDP growth rates. Consequently, more decoupling takes place in
PWT10.0 simply by GDP revision. Since all later vintage plots (b-d) are both roughly centered
around zero when compared with PWT10.0 and from years after the 1993 SNA publication
(published after PWT 5.6), it is likely that the implementation of that SNA revision led to an
upward revision of growth rates on average (see also Assa and Kvangraven, 2021).
In Figure 5 plots (b-d) most of the observations remain in the corridor of +/-2 percentage points
difference. Still, the mean difference in annual growth rates is 0.8 percentage points in plot (b),
and 0.6 and 0.5 in plots (c) and (d) respectively. For these averages, compound growth leads
differences of about 8, 6 and 5 percent in the estimated energy intensity over a decade.
Moreover, a remarkable number of observations lie far below the corridor, even between PWT 8
and PWT 10. Most of these observations represent African countries, including in the most
recent years of data. Knowledge about decoupling patterns is weakest precisely for those
countries in which scenarios plant the highest hopes for “leap-frogging” over past, resource and
pollution intensive phases of development (Semieniuk et al., 2021). This ambiguous evidence
puts in perspective contradictory claims about energy leapfrogging based on – among other
differences – different data vintages and sources (van Benthem, 2015; Liddle and Huntington,
2021).

15
16

Appendix D1 https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/
https://www.resourcepanel.org/data-resources
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Figure 5 | Variance in energy intensity rates of change continent on GDP vintage: In each plot, the x-axis
reports the 10-year average energy intensity rate of change in an older PWT version, the y-axis for PWT 10.0, noted
in the plot’s top left. The diagonal corridor includes observations with less than 2 percentage point difference in
annual growth rate. Green and violet observations see retrospective switches from decoupling to recoupling and vice
versa.

But the most spectacular result is a retrospective flip of the direction of change. That is, a
country that recouples according to the older vintage, is in retrospect shown to decouple and
vice versa. Retrospective decoupling is highlighted green and recoupling dark blue in Figure 5.
Figure 6 plots these observations as a share of total 10-year growth rate observations. The
number of countries reporting a switch is quantitatively important. Researchers studying the
problem some 20 years apart (PWT 6.1 vs 10.0 in plot (a)) would find roughly 15% of countries
switching sign in any 10-year period starting in the mid 1960s. While the flips in one versus the
other direction are first roughly balanced, there is a bias towards decoupling after around 1980.
Even between PWT 8.0 and 10.0 (Figure 5b), only 8 years apart, some more than 5 percent of
12

countries flip sign on average, again with a slight bias towards retrospective decoupling. In other
words, depending on vintage comparison, about 10 to 30 countries would be found to have the
opposite behavior over any given 10 year interval purely due to structural GDP revisions from
the 1960s onward.
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Figure 6 | Share and number of countries with retrospective decoupling or recoupling over 10 year periods.

Even more remarkably, a number of countries switch the sign of their GDP growth over periods
of 10 years, introducing the potential to switch from/to absolute decoupling. Thus, when
switching from PWT6.1 to PWT10.0, 3 to 6 countries over any given 10-year interval are found
to have been in a long-term depression rather than a decade of positive economic growth
(Figure 7a). Fewer cases go the other way. From PWT8.0 to 10.0, about the same numbers of

13

Share of 10 year growth rates that switch

countries switch in both directions (Figure 7b). In other words, even absolute decoupling is to
some extent conventional.
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Figure 7 | Share and number of countries with retrospective switch in the sign of GDP rate of change over 10
years.

4.2.

Impact on environmental Kuznets curve estimates

Two examples illustrate the relevance of these changes for research results. First consider
pollution intensities, the magnitude of interest for the environmental Kuznets curve. The seminal
paper by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger (1995) had over 9,000 citations on Google Scholar
in August 2022, and is the authors’ second/first-most cited paper, followed by their more
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preliminary study on the same topic (Grossman and Krueger, 1991).17 In the 1995 paper,
Grossman and Krueger carefully regress pollution intensity for 14 pollutants on GDP per capita,
its square and cube, as well as on the same powers of the average of the previous three years
of GDP. They find that the GDP coefficients tend to be jointly significant, and from there derive
the conclusion that “for most indicators, economic growth brings an initial phase of deterioration
followed by a subsequent phase of improvement” (p. 353). This inverted u-shape (with
GDP/capita on the x-axis) fuelled the take-off of the environmental Kuznets curve literature,
which continues – with ongoing controversy, due to its policy message – to this day (Dinda,
2004; Stern, 2004; Carson, 2010; Özcan and Öztürk, 2019; Sarkodie and Strezov, 2019).
The Grossman and Krueger (1995) results have subsequently been subjected to scrutiny.
Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson (2002) showed that varying the extent of the dataset or the
pollution measure definition invalidates the results. Torras and Boyce (1998) showed that
adding co-variates on power inequality to the original dataset tempers the inverted u-curve
relationship. Here I ask what a researcher today or a decade ago would find, using
contemporary data on GDP for the periods studied by Grossman and Krueger. Hence, I replace
their GDP (rgdpch) data from the Penn World Table Mark 5 (Summers and Heston, 1991) with
the same years taken from the 7.0 and current 10.0 vintages, without making any other
modification to their data.
Grossman and Krueger estimate cubic polynomials of GDP and its lags and plot their results
which gives a powerful impression of the inverted u shape. I reestimate their curves using their
Stata programs and scaling all GDP vintages to 2017 US-dollars. The rgdpch measure isn’t
available in PWT 10.0 and I report instead all three alternative measures of GDP. rgdpe
measures standards of living while interpolating between benchmark years, i.e., the information
from previous international price comparisons is used, an innovation from PWT 8.0. rgdpo does
the same but includes price indices from exports and imports, and so calculates a country’s
productive capacity rather than the standard of living (which excludes export and import prices).
rgdpna extrapolates from the 2017 benchmarks using national accounts growth rates (like we
use above). While the PWT creators do not recommend using rgdna for both cross-country and
time comparison, it is closest to the previous measures, so I report it for comparison (Feenstra,
Inklaar and Timmer, 2015, p. 3157).

17

The Google Scholar profiles are available at:
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=f46No0UAAAAJ&hl=de&oi=sra for Grossman and
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=5fY6_jMAAAAJ&hl=de&oi=sra for Krueger.
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Figure 8 | Grossman and Krueger re-estimates with different PWT vintages for selected pollutants.

Figure 8 plots the resulting predicted curves for two of their 14 pollutants: smoke in cities, which
has a beautifully inverted u shape in their paper, and mercury concentration in rivers, whose
inverted u-shape is blemished by an uptick for very high incomes but for which the null
hypothesis of joint statistical insignificance of the model’s six GDP parameters cannot be
rejected. Yet, Grossman and Krueger plot it without further comment, presumably adding to the
evidence for the inverted u for most observations. Superimposing the alternative estimates
shows that there is a variety of shapes, muddying an inverted u-shape message. All later smoke
estimates would suggest smoke rises quickly but drops very little after the peak only to then rise
again. For mercury, the ‘peak’ is anywhere from USD0 to USD15,000. The PWT 10.0 rgdpe and
rgdpe estimates have what can be called an uninverted u-shape. The graphs are also scattered
vertically. This is due to the widely scattered pollution data (there are observations above 200
micrograms/m3 for smoke concentration) and the 6 parameter fit of the polynomial that is
sensitive to small variations in the data. As Appendix C Table 1 reports systematically for all 14
pollutants, not all results are equally dispersed, but enough have qualitative changes to question
whether researchers with later GDP vintages would have been able to write with the same
conviction about the initial deterioration and then improvement in environmental quality as GDP
per capita grows.

4.3.

Impact on global energy intensity estimates

As a second example, consider the IEA’s estimate of changes in global historical energy
intensity. These data are e.g. used as a historical benchmark for assessing decoupling
assumptions in future energy and climate scenarios (see e.g. IPCC 2018, SPM1). The IEA
publishes a new vintage of its dataset every year, which updates its energy and GDP data,
including an estimate for the world. Figure 9a shows an index of the world energy intensity for
eight vintages. Until around 1990, not much difference can be detected but then the time series
start to fan out. Newer vintages tend to show a faster decline. Over the period 1971-2010, the
vintages from 2013 and 2015 had a compound annual decline of -0.8%, compared with -1.0% in
the 2021 vintage. As the Figure 9b main window shows this led the 2021 vintage to report an
8% lower energy intensity by 2010 than the 2013 vintage. The insets in Fig 9b further show that
this downward bias is due entirely to GDP accounting, not that for primary energy. The energy
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Figure 9 | Global energy intensity for vintages of the IEA World Indicators, using PPP GDP.

Such divergence over decades matters greatly for mitigation scenarios. Suppose modelers
extrapolated the intensity trend over the next 40 years and updated with the faster intensity
decline. 8% less energy demand for a given GDP in 2060 implies 8% less energy demand and
less required mitigation. In principle, faster energy intensity decline should only reflect a faster
growing GDP so the amount of energy demanded should not change. In practice, it is unclear to
what extent these updates are synchronized. For instance that modelers who have exogenous
GDP growth as an input into their model could take the GDP projections based on 2012 World
Bank PPP GDP and provided by Dellink et al. (2017) which are promoted as a standard for the
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, but calculate energy intensity projections from more updated
IEA data. In this case, decoupling would seem easier while GDP growth is ‘slow’, leading to an
overall lower pressure on energy demand as an accounting artifact.

4.4.

Discussion

The foregoing results show that evidence for decoupling varies in an economically important
way with GDP revisions over time. It follows that the entrenched debate about whether EKCs
exist or not, and the extent to which decoupling can be expected to lead to growing economy
that sheds its current environmental impact, is marred by an ambiguity that hasn’t previously
been acknowledged. Evidence from different sources can only be directly compared if both
sources use the same GDP definition. If they do not, it is unclear whether one is more
appropriate than the other. If social reality changes over time as expressed by structural
revisions in GDP, it throws a spanner in the works of establishing a truth by accumulating a
growing body of evidence. These news may be vexing to the environmental scientists who
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contribute a good part of the evidence on this subject, but it is necessary to acknowledge the
role of social reality that intensity indicators with GDP in the denominator embody.
One objection to this claim of ambiguity is that while GDP may change on the margin, it does
not make a difference for the qualitative results in meta-analyses. Of course it is unlikely that
between two structural GDP revisions a large share of countries would switch from positive to
negative long-term GDP growth or vice versa and provide a completely different account about
the potential for absolute decoupling. However, the results about the frequent switches in
relative decoupling suggest that plenty of room for arguing about whether we are seeing a
tendency toward or away from decoupling exists. And the results on the EKC do not seem to
come to any agreement on a particular shape, at least for some pollutants. It is also important to
note that GDP is but one more indicator that can change, compounding rather than introducing
ambiguity into the results.
Another objection could follow national accountants to claim that GDP revisions render a
superior picture of the economy as it is today. Therefore, results arrived at with later vintages
should be privileged over older ones.18 The problem introduced by this claim is that surely
previous GDP vintages were ‘superior’ in their day. Is the GDP vintage in 2020 really better for
understanding the 1980 economy than the 1980 vintage that was created by people living
through the problems of the day? This line of reasoning with its emphasis on the current
economy would suggest it is not. If this claim was made, moreover, it does not seem possible to
use past trends arrived at with today’s vintage to make confident projections into future. Surely
future accountants will have a different view about what is important in the economy and will
revise GDP accordingly.
If, with several economists cited earlier, the opposite position is taken instead that GDP and its
revisions do not necessarily provide a good or improving description of the economy, the
consequences are even more powerful. If GDP does not capture the actual functioning of an
economy well, then the usefulness of intensity indicators deteriorates. For instance, if one
believes that growth is understated in rich economies due to an underestimation of the value of
innovations, then the decoupling potential in these economies may remain unrecognized,
leading to unduly timid policy goals. The opposite problem is more worrisome. If growth rates in
developing countries are overstated due to GDP revisions but also purchasing power parity in
models of the economy and climate change, this could inspire overconfidence in the carbon
emission mitigation potential in these economies according to models using such GDP rates.
Consequently, it may turn out to be harder to reduce emissions in these countries than the
modelling effort suggested, frustrating ambitions. It may also lead to calls by rich countries for
developing countries to take on a larger share of the mitigation burden because of the apparent
ease with which they decouple.19 All in all, measurement changes in GDP can have important
real-world policy implications that are currently underappreciated in the environmental policy
debate.

5. Conclusion
This paper has traced structural revisions in how GDP is accounted for and shown that these
revisions impact measures of decoupling in a quantitatively and qualitatively important way.
Some countries switch from decoupling to recoupling and vice versa, environmental Kuznets
curve estimates are sensitive to the GDP vintage used and the IEA has been reporting
18
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I thank Tiago Domingos for making this argument at the ISEE conference.
I thank Jayati Ghosh for alerting me to this possibility.
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accelerating GDP growth rates for the world, leading to a faster historically estimate of energy
intensity decline. The dilemma is that there is no particular reason why one vintage is better
than the other. Decoupling analysts must recognize an ambiguity built into the denominator of
their intensity measures, just as they have become accustomed to problems such as different
patterns of de- and recoupling for territorial vs footprint measures of the numerator. This is
particularly important for modeling long-term economic and environmental change, where
historical correlations between GDP and other measures are used both for model calibration
and validation.
I draw three conclusions. First, to advance insight, debate and scenario modeling, rigorous
reporting of GDP definitions, vintage, and the sharing of data for subsequent comparison and
replication in empirical analyses, is urgently needed. The data sharing is particularly important
because older vintages of GDP or other macro data are not normally available in the usual
repositories (the PWT and recent vintages at the BEA being commendable exceptions). And
repositories of scenarios of the future stemming from different models likely using various
underlying historical time series should require modeling teams to add information on the
vintage of these times series for each component of these ‘ensembles of opportunity’
(Huppmann et al., 2018), so that later analysist have the ability to discriminate between models
also along this dimension.
Second, the unreliability of some decoupling estimates highlights the limitations of using
evidence for or against historical decoupling in the debate about the feasibility of continued
economic growth under successful measures to halt and reverse environmental degradation
(Pollin, 2019; Schor and Jorgenson, 2019). One alternative is to focus directly on the indicators
that need to decline (e.g. CO2 emissions) or stay within ‘planetary boundaries’. Since these are
often concentrated in certain activities or sectors (e.g. emissions from fossil-fuel production or
use in certain applications) it could be more effective to focus on sectoral growth or degrowth
(Pollin, 2018) instead of reasoning in terms of the whole economy. It also follows that policy
targets formulated in terms of aggregate intensities should be specific about the GDP definition
used or use absolute emissions/resource figures rather than intensities to avoid ambiguity.
Third, beyond the epistemological barriers to understanding decoupling presented here, the
work by Desrosières (1998) reminds us that the revision of GDP series itself may influence how
the possibility of decoupling is perceived. This political element was recently examined and
found to influence indicators of ecological impact (Requena-i-Mora and Brockington, 2022).
Seen from this perspective, rather than variation over vintages being a conundrum, the variation
serves as an opportunity for a robustness check on the susceptibility of current GDP estimates
to political preoccupations of the day.
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Appendix A: Reasons for structural revisions
The first reason for structural revisions is the reference year change. It presents an index
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number problem. Since GDP is measured at current prices, but the magnitude of interest is
often ‘real’ growth, national accountants subtract inflation from economic growth and so attempt
to recover the growth in the actual quantity of goods and services. Traditionally, in the US,
Laspeyres quantity indices were used that compare quantities in the reference year measured
at reference year prices with quantities in other years but also measured at reference year
prices (constant dollars). Fixing dollars, and so the weight by which goods and services entered
into the GDP aggregate, however, makes growth rates contingent on the reference year. In
particular, it causes substitution bias (Braithwait, 1980), which tends to overestimate growth
rates after the reference period and underestimate growth rates before the reference period.
The problem is that consumption tends to shift towards sectors with relatively low price
increases (think of solar PV panels), thereby overweighting the output of periods prior to the
reference period and underestimating the change in real GDP. Conversely inflation is
overestimated. The U.S. therefore switched to Fisher or chained-dollar quantity indices that
instead use information about prices from both periods in 1996. Changing the reference period
has no impact on their measured growth rate (for a detailed discussion and examples see
Landefeld, Moulton and Vojtech, 2003). This may be one reason for the relatively large jump in
the pre-reference year growth rates between the 1987 and 1999 structural revisions depicted in
figure 2b above. One drawback of chained-price measures is that GDP cannot anymore be
partitioned exactly into its components like major expenditure categories, such as consumption
and investment (Landefeld, Moulton and Vojtech, 2003). The rebasing of the reference year
itself is a technical problem. It has a political component however as base-year and choice of
deflation method affect the reporting of the economy’s past performance.
The second and more controversial because less technical driver of structural changes are
redefinitions of what counts as part of GDP and how. National accountants themselves stress
that GDP and other aggregates need to “meet a wide range of analytical purposes” (European
Commission et al., 2009, p. 6), therefore they must “provide a relevant and accurate picture of
the evolving U.S. [or any other] economy” (Fixler, Greenaway-Mcgrevy and Grimm, 2014, p. 1).
To retain this usefulness, it follows, the accounts must evolve with the economy. Thus, Fixler
and colleagues (ibid, footnote 1) point out that investment in software was negligible in the
1950s but grew to 1.7% of GDP by 2012, implying that not including it as investment (but as
intermediate consumption and hence cost to final consumers, netted out), would make the
‘picture’ of the economy less relevant. They also note that its inclusion in the 1999
comprehensive revision raised level and growth rates of the economy. This is a case where a
new component was added, that grew faster than existing components historically, thus raising
past growth rates. There is a wide variety of redefinitions, and they range from large (changing
the treatment of financial sector or government) to more subtle such as hedonic pricing to
account for product quality (Coyle, 2014). The main point is that these revisions do impact GDP
growth rates as growth rates are changed either directly or through the alteration of component
weights.
It is difficult to exactly trace the causes of redefinitions, but safe to say that national accountants
are critically accompanied by economists. Many critiques by economists are motivated by value
theory. Simon Kuznets famously prepared the first U.S. national income estimates in 1931 but
disagreed with the national accounting framework settled on after the Second World War.
Kuznets was convinced that the national income should reflect welfare, not economic activity, so
closer to the value theory based on classic utilitarianism propounded in Pigou (1920). From this
stance, Kuznets argued that many ‘final expenditures’ of households adding to GDP should
really be “business costs” (Kuznets, 1948, p. 157). This refers to employees’ personal
expenditures enabling them to do their work (e.g. a public transport ticket to get to work). If
Kuznets was moved by neoclassical economics to shrink GDP, more recent critiques motivated
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by neoclassical economics tend to argue for enlarging GDP. Recently proposed changes often
revolve around better measurement of intangibles and innovation (Jorgenson, 2009; Coyle,
2014; Corrado et al., 2021) or how best to account for digital services (Brynjolfsson and McAfee,
2014), and would align national accounts more with measuring growth drivers identified in the
recent endogenous growth literature.

Economists taking other than a neoclassical lens have other critiques. Feminist economists
have shown the impact of the treatment of unpaid (care) work on GDP growth rates (Wagman
and Folbre, 1996), a concern that overlaps with problems of measuring the informal economy,
the largest economic sector in many countries (Ghosh, 2020). Reich (2001) has elaborated
inconsistencies between neoclassical value theory and national accounts and shows that in
important respects the accounts construction is more compatible with classical political
economy. Marxist economists that distinguish a sphere of production and one of exchange (that
does not however add value) show how such more restricted or redefined measures of output
correlate better with other macroeconomic measures of interest such as investment,
(un)employment or inequality (Wolff, 1987; Shaikh and Tonak, 1994; Basu and Foley, 2013;
Assa, 2017; Tercioglu, 2021).20 One likely reason for the good correlation is that these
alternative measures tend to reduce what is an increasing share of imputed value added in
national accounts (Foley, 2013). A recent slate of contributions investigates the political
motivations behind national accounts definitions and (lack of) revisions. Christophers (2011)
recounts the political process of ‘making finance productive’ in the national accounts, which
accompanies the broader trend of financialization of economies (Epstein, 2005), and Mazzucato
(2018) argues that national accounts may undervalue government activity (see also Eisner and
Nebhut, 1981). Assa (2017) consequently labels GDP as “statistical rhetoric with political goals”
(p. 22). All of this is to say, that economic theory has and will continue to exert pressure on
redefinitions of GDP.21
A third important cause for revisions has to do with the use of new datasets, even apart from
conceptual novelties. To return to the 1965 Survey of Current Business, some changes in the
US GDP definition then were due to new incorporation of company censuses that revised
historical data. In 2010, Ghana’s GDP was revised 60% upwards mainly due to the use of new
data (Jerven, 2013), and in 2012 Nigeria’s GDP was revised upwards by 100% (Feenstra,
Inklaar and Timmer, 2015).22 And the controversy over India’s recent GDP growth being in good
part not about completely new data but about which of several existing datasets (and
assumptions about the informal sector) to use also highlights the political nature of this type of
revision (Nagaraj, Sapre and Sengupta, 2021). Finally, it may also be that countries’
governments intervene in the publications of figures for political reasons, so the revision is more
about withholding than releasing data (Seltzer, 1994). In sum, there are many reasons why
GDP definitions are changed and these will persist into the future.

20

Marxist-feminist social reproduction theory instead uses an expanded measurement base (Moos, 2021).
Naturally there are also debates about revisions of components of GDP, such as investment and savings (Pollin,
1997).
22
Of course, these changes also affect past GDP and only have an impact on growth rates to the extent that the new
data shows other trends over time.
21
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Appendix B: Purchasing power parity example
The basic idea of purchasing power parity is simple: suppose that after exchanging a certain
amount of currency from country A for that of country B at MER, one can buy twice the amount
of goods and services in country B that one could have with that money in country A. Think of
being able to purchase 2 instead of 1 haircuts in country B. Country A has higher prices.
Expressed in the currency of country A, the ‘real’ GDP of country B should be twice as big as
the MER would suggest. Country B’s prices are lower for the same goods and so need to be
‘inflated’ for comparison. Empirical PPP estimates show that price levels in rich countries tend to
be higher (so-called Penn effect) and therefore the GDP of developing countries needs to be
inflated for comparison. For instance, India’s MER GDP in 2020 was $2.7 trillion but its PPP
GDP was $9.0 trillion.23

Appendix C: Additional Grossman Krueger calculations
Table A1 reports my reestimation of Grossman and Krueger’s internal maxima and minima, for
the three PWT vintages for each of their pollutants. Variation of the GDP/person level at which
the “EKC turning point” occurs can be large, e.g. for lead or sulfur dioxide, even when all
estimates are statistically significant. Changes in the sign of the cubic polynomial are reported
with a ^. This change is particularly powerful when the min lies to the left of the maximum, i.e.
the EKC turning point but is above zero. NA means the polynomial declines monotonically.
Changes in statistical significance are reported in the right column. As the smoke example
shows, these qualitative change indicators do not exhaust the possible variations in levels and
shape, which could be gleaned from a look at the plot.
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Data as of January 13, 2022. Series NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD on https://data.worldbank.org/
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Table A1. Grossmann and Krueger cubic polynomial with internal max (=EKC turning
point) and min in thousands 2017$ per capita with varying GDP vintages and measures
PWT5
PWT7.0
PWT10.0
Pollutant
rgdpch rgdpch
rgdpe
rgdpo
rgdpna Joint significance*
Max
9.7
11.5
10.1
10.3
12.0
Arsenic
Min
28.9
36.4
29.7
30.3
34.7
Max
15.1
^15.4
14.2
13.2
^16.8 PWT 10.0 GDP
coefficients jointly
BOD
Min
74.8
^-70.1
89.8
52.2
^-22.6 insignificant
Cadmium

COD
Coliform
Dissolved
oxygen**
Fecal
coliform
Lead
Mercury
Nickel
Nitrate

Smoke

Max

22.9

23.5

22.1

23.2

Min

9.0

12.5

8.0

8.5

Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max

15.5
-79.7
6.0
16.2
-31.9
5.3
15.7
0.6
3.7
28.1
10.0
24.5
8.2
29.0

^19.1
^277.2
6.0
20.6
^5.0
^14.0
^5.3
^34.1
10.8
36.3
11.2
27.6
NA
NA

19.5
-0.2
10.0
32.8
-5.7
8.5
14.5
-5.1
7.98
30.2
-0.7
21.2
^25.8
^11.4

18.2
-6.7
11.2
45.1
-45.9
8.5
14.0
-12.4
7.85
30.4
4.97
22.8
^25.5
^11.6

20.8

19.0

20.6

20.6

Min

3.2

-4.4

0.6

-1.0

Max
12.23
14.4
11.8
Min
30.5
27.0
25.3
Sulfur
Max
7.9
5.8
0.9
dioxide
Min
26.7
32.8
26.9
Suspended Max
NA
23.3
NA
particles
Min
NA
13.7
NA
* Empty cells imply all estimates are jointly significant.
** Not a pollutant, u-shape expected.
^ Order of local max and min reversed
NA monotone slope.

11.7
24.3
2.1
28.2
52.0
38.5

NA rgdpe & rgdpo
coefficients jointly
NA insignificant
21.3
-6.9
7.3
21.2
6.7
17.3
^10.4
^43.2
11.73
39.7
14.1
32.4
NA
NA

Coefficients always
jointly insignificant

Coefficients always
jointly insignificant
Coefficients always
jointly insignificant
25.8 PWT 7.0 GDP
coefficients jointly
6.2 insignificant

11.0
23.1
10.0
44.7
138.0
21.6
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